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BOOK REVIEWS
Dr. Wertham, in one of his perceptive assertions, states: "We are apt
to use psychiatry like a drunk uses a lamp post: not for the light, but to lean
against."'9 The reviewer feels he has done just that in A Sign For Cain. Psy-
chiatry was used as a reason for collecting a myriad of every variety of violent
acts, which were then strung together much more as if gathered by a news-
clipping service than by a social scientist searching for patterns and meanings.
There is a table of contents and an index for which the examiner found
little use. The bibliography, however, does supply a handy and extensive list
of books and reviews concerning violence.
This book may have some value for the enormous collection of brief
sketches of man's inhumanity to man. Anyone with even minimal experience
in law or medicine or just the daily press would have little to learn from this
presentation. It could have been a provocative in-depth study by a man with
an enormous collection of personal studies, a vast experience with the courts,
a tremendous and broad general knowledge, and a deep dedication to helping
mankind.
Let us hope that Dr. Wertham will yet present us with this book that
could have been.
Harold P. Graser, M.D.
Assistant Professor of Psychiatry,
School of Medicine;
Lecturer, School of Law, State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo
THE EuROPEA, CONVENTION ON Hum'AN RIGHTS. London: The British Insti-
tute of International and Comparative Law, 1965. Pp. viii, 106. 17s. 6d.
The book under review is a collection of six essays on the European Con-
vention of Human Rights1 which were delivered in 1964 at a London Con-
ference sponsored by the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law. The six authors are well-known for their outstanding contributions to the
literature on the Convention and, with the exception of Professor Buergenthal,
all hold official positions either with the Convention Institutions or the Council
of Europe.2 Each of the authors discusses a different aspect of the Convention's
9. P. 22.
1. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and
the Significance of the European Convention; Dr. A. H. Robertson, The Political Background
and Historical Development of the European Convention on Human Rights; Dr. H. Golsong,
The Control Machinery of the European Convention on Human Rights; Mr. J. E. S.
Fawcett, Some Aspects of the Practice of the Commission of Human Rights: Its Sanctions
and Practice; Professor Thomas Buergenthal, The Effect of the European Convention on
Human Rights on the Internal Law of Member States.
2. Sir Humphrey Waldock is a former Chairman of the European Commission of
Human Rights and recently elected justice of the European Court of Human Rights; Dr.
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development, from the history of the protection of human rights in international
law to the creation of the Convention, and beyond, to its practice and domestic
effects. Together, these essays present a brief but thorough introduction to the
Coniention suitable for both legal scholar and layman.
I
To put the contents of this book into perspective, it is necessary to briefly
survey the historical progress of human rights in international law. The de-
velopment of institutions to provide international protection for human rights is
a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Under the customary law of nations,
states were generally regarded as having absolute discretion in all their internal
affairs. The right of aliens not to be treated below a minimum international
standard was, of course, a well recognized exception to the general rule. In the
event of a violation by a state of its international obligation toward aliens, the
victim (after exhausting local remedies) could look to his own country to
espouse his claim. The exercise of the right of diplomatic protection by a state
developed as a means of preventing more serious interstate conflicts. Relief
for the victim was an incidental result. Apart from this theory of state responsi-
bility, states often claimed the right to intervene in another state's internal
affairs for humanitarian reasons. However, the cases of true "humanitarian inter-
vention" were rare, if indeed, they occurred at all. 3 In this century, protection of
minority groups by the Minority Treaties placed under the guarantee of the
League of Nations, and by the Mandate System of the League, were the first
institutional attempts to extend the traditional scope of international protection
of human rights. More recently, the United Nations has tried to internationalize
the protection of human rights. The members of the United Nations have each
undertaken to "promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. "
However, the most advanced institution for the protection of human rights is the
European Convention of Human Rights which has been ratified by most of the
countries of Western Europe.5 The purpose of the Convention is to enforce some
of the fundamental rights proclaimed in the United Nations Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. 6 In this collective effort, the member states have given
up their traditional sovereignty to an unprecedented degree.
A. H. Robertson is Head of the Directorate of Human Rights of the Council of Europe;
James Fawcett and A. B. McNulty are, respectively, a member and the Secretary of that
Commission; Dr. H. Golsong is the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights.
3. See Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights 17-44 (1962); Lauterpacht,
International Law and Human Rights 32-33 (1950).
4. U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56.
5. Only the eighteen member states of the Council of Europe are eligible to adhere to
the Convention. At present fifteen states have ratified the Convention. They are: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Three
members of the Council of Europe remain outside the Convention. They are: France,
Switzerland and Malta.
6. The preamble of the Convention declares the purpose of the members to "take the
first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal
Declaration [of Human Rights]."
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Under the Convention, the contracting states undertake to secure, the
guaranteed rights to "everyone within their jurisdiction" 7 regardless of nation-
ality. To ensure the enforcement of the rights which it proclaims, the Convention
established a Commission of Human Rights as well as a Court of Human Rights.8
Petitions alleging violations of the Convention must first be accepted by the
Commission whose function in this respect is quasi-judicial. While ratifying
states have the right to bring complaints to the Commission by virtue of their
membership in the Convention, individuals may do so only if the allegedly
delinquent state has, in addition to ratification, separately recognized the juris-
diction of the Commission to entertain individual petitions.0 If the Commission
finds a petition admissible, it then performs its investigatory and conciliatory
functions. It undertakes an investigation of the facts of the alleged breach of
the Convention, and upon discovering the violation, tries to induce a friendly
settlement.' 0 If the parties do not settle their differences informally, the Com-
mission must transmit a report containing findings of fact and an opinion on
the merits to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe." If the case
is not submitted to the Court within a period of three months after the Commis-
sion has transmitted the Report, the Committee of Iinisters must make the
final decision. 12 Only the Commission or an interested state can submit disputes
to the Court,13 and then, only if the defendant state has made a separate
declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court.' 4 Unlike the Commission,
the proceedings before the Court are public. The judgment of the Court is final
and binding on the parties to the case.' 5
Despite the assertion in the preamble of the Convention that the contracting
parties are "like-minded and have a common heritage of political tradition," it
should be noted that, in fact, these countries represent different legal systems as
well as attitudes toward individual liberty. The rights and freedoms defined in
section I of the Convention must, therefore, be applied in a variety of contexts.
Affording uniform protection for all individuals raises immensely difficult and
complex comparative law problems for the Convention organs. These comparative
foreign law questions will also intrigue the American lawyer who encounters
7. Convention, art. 1.
8. For a detailed description of the Convention institutions, see Buergenthal, Com-
parative Study of Certain Due Process Requirements of the European Human Rights Con-
vention, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 18-22 (1966).
9. This is the so-called optional right of private petition of article 25 of the Conven-
tion. The following eleven countries have recognized the competence of the Commission to
deal with individual complaints: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
10. Convention, art. 28.
11. Convention, art. 31.
12. Convention, art. 32.
13. Convention, art. 48.
14. Convention, art. 46. The following eleven states have accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Note that these are the same states which recognize the competence of the Commission to
deal with individual complaints. See supra note .9.
15. Convention, arts. 52, 53.
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analogous problems in American constitutional law. The American 'lawyer also
should remember that the broad provisions of the Convention protect the
American traveling in those countries which have ratified the Convention. In fact,
a number of cases involving Americans already have been recorded in the Con-
vention Yearbooks.' 6
II
The first two essays, by Waldock and Robertson, are most profitably read
together. Professor Waldock describes the legal development of international
attempts to protect human rights discussed above, and evaluates the contribution
of the Convention. Dr. Robertson traces the political history of the Convention
from its immediate origins in the post-war movements for European unity.
Following World War II, the nations of Europe faced the threat of a Communist
take-over. Having narrowly escaped from the Hitler tyranny, the threat of
another dictatorship strongly reinforced their desire to collectively secure the
protection of human rights and democracy. Such political considerations lay
behind the Council of Europe's attempt to draft a convention on human rights in
1949. Dr. Robertson discusses the draft proposals and shows how, after the
immediate political crisis subsided, the nations again became jealous of their
national sovereignty. The Convention's innovations, drastic as they are, repre-
sent a number of significant compromises. After discussing the changes in the
final revision of the Convention, Robertson briefly analyzes the operation of
several of its more important provisions. He then concludes his history of the
Convention with a short discussion of the impact of the Convention in other parts
of the world.
Both Robertson and Waldock (and Golsong as well17) regard the right of
private petition as the Convention's most important contribution to the de-
velopment of international protection of human rights. As Waldock notes, the
necessity of the provision for private petition is demonstrated by the fact that
only three interstate complaints have thus far been received by the Commission.
States normally are reluctant to provoke disputes with other friendly states in
cases which do not involve their own national interest. Thus, the recognition of
the right of private petition is an indispensable condition to any adequate system
of enforcement.
In the Convention, the right of private petition was extended far beyond
earlier attempts to give an individual the right to bring matters before an
international body. Once a state has made a declaration pursuant to article 25
recognizing the right of private petition before the Commission, this right may
be exercised by any "person, non-governmental organization or group of indi-
viduals" regardless of nationality or lack of it. This is such a remarkable step
that one is tempted to overlook the shortcomings of the procedure. The absence
16. See 7 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 380 (1964).
17. P. 54.
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of a critical attitude is notable in the evaluations made by Waldock, Robertson
and Golsong. A more balanced view of the remedy ought to consider the failure
of the Convention to give the individual standing in the Court. Since he lacks the
standing before the Court that he has before the Commission, the individual
cannot himself obtain a legal adjudication of his claim and, moreover, cannot
participate directly in the proceedings even if his case is otherwise referred to
the Court. Except in the rare circumstance where a state submits a complaint, the
individual hds no representative to advocate his cause before the Court.18 If, in
addition, one considers the highly contingent jurisdictional requirements of the
Court, and the expense and delay' 9 involved in proceedings before the Commis-
sion and the Court, it should be obvious that a truly effective remedy is yet to
be devised.
IIl
The third essay, by Dr. H. Golsong, examines in detail the control ma-
chinery of the Convention-namely, the European Commission of Human Rights,
the European Court of Human Rights, and the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe. Among the subjects discussed are the organization of the
Commission and the Court, the independence and qualifications of members of
the Commission and Court, privileges and immunities of officials of the Conven-
tion, and the legal position of the Commission and Court vis-a-vis the Council
of Europe. The bulk of the essay is devoted to a description of how the Con-
vention organs dispose of alleged violations of the guaranteed rights. The discus-
sion covers a host of related problems: who can bring proceedings and in what
circumstances; the requirements of admissibility of the petition by the Com-
mission, jurisdiction of the Court; the relationship between the Commission and
the Committee of Ministers, and between the Commission and the Court; and the
position of the individual before the Commission and before the Court. Dr.
Golsong presents a great wealth of information and insight which this short
review cannot do justice. However, there are two points which deserve comment
because they are particularly controversial. The first concerns the practice of
the Commission in interpreting the Convention when deciding the admissibility
18. In his statement to the Human Rights Court as the Commission's principal delegate
in the famous "Lawless" Case (Preliminary objections and questions of procedure),
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of November 14, 1960, 3 Yearbook 492 (1960),
Professor Waldock defined the role of the Commission before the Court:
The fact that in every case the Commission has to conduct an objective and impartial
investigation . . . makes it impossible for the Commission, when the case comes
before the Court, to depart from its objectivity and impartiality, and impossible
for it to identify itself either with the Government or with the individual ....
[F]or the Commission to express its opinion on a case is one thing, and for it to take
up the case of one side and to contend for the success of that case before the
Court is quite another thing.
[1960-61) European Court of Human Rights, Series B: Pleadings, Oral Arguments and
Documents, "Lawless" Case 234.
19. In the "Lawless" case, the final decision of the Court came five years after the
petition was received by the Commission.
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of individual applications. In one well-known case,20 the Commission found an
individual application inadmissible by a 6-4 vote (a minority of the full Com-
mission) on the ground that the provisions of the 1916 Norwegian Act, requiring
work in public dental service in northern Norway, did not constitute "compulsory
labor" within the meaning of article 4 of the Convention. Dr. Golsong cites this
case as an example of the perversion of the Commission's authority to reject
petitions which are manifestly ill-founded. 21 "This way of interpreting the Con-
vention and provisions cannot, of course, be considered as the normal pro-
cedure. It largely seems to overstep the limits of a prima facie examination of
the merits." 22 Golsong nevertheless suggests that the Commission not be judged
harshly since it is only acting out an excess of caution so as not to jeopardize the
acceptance of the right of individual petition by other governments. Yet, under
the present Convention, a negative decision by the Commission on admissibility,
even if clearly wrong, is not subject to review by anyone. Query whether the
Court should not have at least a discretionary power to review this question
before the application finally is denied.
The second point deserving comment involves the controversy over the
Commission practice of allowing most cases to be decided by the Committee of
Ministers rather than by the Court. Under article 32 of the Convention, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe must make the final decision
in a case if, within three months after the Commission's report has been trans-
mitted to the Committee, the matter has not been referred to the Court by the
Commission or a state concerned in the case. However, the Convention is silent
as to the test the Commission should employ in making the determination to
submit a case to the Court. Dr. Golsong justly criticizes this tendency to bypass
the Court as subversive of the rule of law. He makes the following argument
against permitting decision by the Committee on alleged violations of the rights
guaranteed in the Convention:
[W]hen a governmental representative has to take part in a
vote in pursuance of Article 32, paragraph 1, he will never lose sight
of the political interests of his State. Thus, the power of decision...
will in general be exercised in accordance with political interests. This,
of course, is in no way satisfactory within a system of control the main
purpose of which is the maintenance of the rule of law.P
The logic of this position suggests that the "maintenance of the rule of law"
requires decision by the Court in nearly all cases. Without entering into an
extended discussion of the merits or demerits of Golsong's position, it is
sufficient to note that the Commission, under pressure from a variety of
20. Iverson v. Norway, App. No. 1468/62, 6 Yearbook of The European Convention
on Human Rights 278 (1963).








The two essays by Fawcett and McNulty treat selected aspects of the
practice of the Convention organs. Mr. Fawcett covers a number of controversial
topics in rapid fashion. He briefly suggests that the Commission is neither
usurping the role of the Court, nor too politically oriented; that the voting
procedure whereby less than a majority of the Full Commission may decide the
issue of admissibility may be justified because the Commission is not really a
court; and that dissenting opinions have no place in the decisions of the Com-
mission. The McNulty essay, in contrast, is limited to a discussion of the in-
formal sanctions available to the Commission in enforcing the rights guaranteed
by the Convention. Mr. McNulty presents instances where the threat of an
adverse decision by the Commission has induced corrective action on the part of
the allegedly delinquent state. Although the Commission's Report is neither
published nor binding as a judgment, states will normally want to avoid the
risk of a legal determination by the Committee or the Court. Mr. McNulty ably
demonstrates from his personal experience as Secretary to the Commission how
the practical enforcement of the Convention has often depended on the Commis-
sion's use of this informal coercion.
V
In the final essay, Professor Buergenthal inquires into the effect of the
European Convention on the internal law of member states. The first part of
the essay examines the obligation of states adhering to the Convention to enact
its provisions into domestic law. At first glance, this question may seem irrelevant
since member states clearly are under a positive duty under article 13 to provide
an effective domestic remedy for the violation of the rights set forth in the Con-
vention. It is Buergenthal's belief that the requirements of article 13 cannot be
satisfied in practice unless an individual can rely on specific provisions of the
Convention in the domestic forum. This is true because the determination that a
violation has occurred must always be postponed in countries where the Con-
vention is not domestic law until the case comes before the Commission. 26 After
reviewing the status of the Convention in the member states, Professor Buergen-
thal turns to the question of the domestic effect of judgments of the Court of
Human Rights, dividing them into "direct" and "indirect" effects. The direct
effects involve the problem of how, if at all, a judgment of the Human Rights
24. See Robertson, Human Rights in Europe 81 (1963) (suggesting that the Commission
try to distinguish between cases that are essentially political, and cases that are essentially
legal); Buergenthal, Book Review, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 301, 305 (1964) (proposing that all
individual applications should be referred to the Court once the jurisdictional requirements
are present, while interstate disputes should be generally submitted to the Committee since
the states are themselves free to resort to the Court).
25. See, e.g., European Commission of Human Rights, Minutes of the 56th Plenary
Session, Council of Europe, Doc. DH(65) No. 5, p. 3 (1965).
26. See Convention, art. 26.
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Court may legally affect an adjudication which is res judicata as a matter of
domestic law. Since the Human Rights Court was not intended to be a "court of
fourth instance or a Cour de Cassation," it cannot reverse or annul the prior
conflicting domestic decision. However, Professor Buergenthal finds a solution
to the problem in article 50. Under this article, the Court may afford "just
satisfaction" if the individual cannot obtain an adequate domestic remedy.
27
While states are not under an obligation to implement the Court's decision into
their own law, they still must provide other relief as determined by the Court.
Nevertheless, as Professor Buergenthal observes, there is nothing to prevent a
state from giving direct domestic effect to the judgment of the Court. Buergenthal
argues that the Convention recognizes just this possibility by providing in
article 50 that the Court determine whether the domestic law provides adequate
relief. A number of interesting procedures are suggested to give effect to the
Court decisions. The reader will find a cogent presentation of the pros and cons
of each suggested measure.
The "indirect" effects of the Court's judgments concern the problem of
precedent-to what extent are domestic judges bound to follow the decisions of
the Human Rights Court in subsequent domestic cases. Buergenthal explains how
the weight of Court precedent is influenced by the presence or absence of various
factors, such as the domestic status of the Convention, the recognition of the right
of private petition and the jurisdiction of the Court, and the domestic attitude
toward stare decisis. The problem of the indirect effect of Court decisions would
largely disappear if domestic courts were allowed (or required) to ask the Court
for preliminary rulings in cases which involve interpretation of the Convention.
However, since this procedure is not likely to be adopted in the near future, the
analysis in this essay remains an excellent predictive model of domestic court
behavior.
VI
Taken as a whole, the different aspects of the Convention's work presented
in these six essays provide a balanced perspective of the Convention. While some
of the authors tend to be too laudatory, most of the problem areas are discussed
or at least suggested. Today, the future of the European Convention appears
bright. Only last year, for example, Great Britain recognized the right of private
petition and the jurisdiction of the Court. The next few years should see many
important new development as the work load of the Commission and especially
the Court increases. This book will be read by those who are interested in follow-
ing the progressive contributions of the Convention to the international quest for
human dignity.
ROBERT M. KORN rICH
Senior Member
Buffalo Law Review
27. The Convention is ambiguous as to the power of the Court in the case where the
internal law does not provide any reparation. For two possible interpretations of the
application of article 50 in this situation, see Robertson, op. cit. supra note 24 at 104-105.
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